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This paper investigates the relation between a firm's location and its corporate finance decisions. We
develop a simple model where being located within an industry cluster increases opportunities to make
acquisitions, and to facilitate those acquisitions, firms within clusters maintain more financial slack.
Consistent with our model we find that firms that are located within industry clusters tend to make
more acquisitions, and have lower debt ratios and larger cash balances than their industry peers located
outside clusters. In addition, we document that firms in growing cities and technology centers also
maintain more financial slack. Overall, these findings, which reveal systematic patterns between geography
and corporate finance choices, suggest the importance of growth opportunities in firms’ financial decisions.
Andres Almazan
Finance Department
McCombs School of Business





Bronfman Building, Rm 581





McCombs School of Business





Michael F. Price College of Business
Division of Finance
University of Oklahoma
307 W. Brooks, Suite 252
Norman, Oklahoma 73019-4005
uysal@ou.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In 1992 the Apache Corporation, then a small oil and gas ﬁrm located in Denver (CO), ac-
quired MW Petroleum, a subsidiary of Amoco Corporation, a major integrated oil company.
This acquisition, which more than doubled the size of its oil and gas reserves, was viewed
by Apache’s top management as a major success, and to a large extent deﬁned Apache’s
future strategy: to grow by acquiring mature oil and gas ﬁelds from the major integrated
oil ﬁrms. To implement this strategy Apache moved from Denver to Houston (TX), where
most of the major oil ﬁrms had operations, and reduced its debt ratio to improve its credit
rating. By locating in Houston, Apache’s management believed that they would have better
access and knowledge about potential deals. Maintaining an investment grade bond rating
(Apache had a B rating when they acquired MW Petroleum and reached an A rating a
few years later) was viewed by Apache’s management as essential, since their acquisition
strategy required an ability to raise capital on relatively short notice.1
This paper examines whether, as suggested by the Apache case, a ﬁrm’s acquisition and
ﬁnancial policies are related to its location. More speciﬁcally, we examine whether a ﬁrm’s
tendency to make acquisitions and its capital structure choices are related to whether or not
the ﬁrm is located within an industry cluster, that is, close to its industry peers. To study
these issues, we start by developing a simple model that describes the relation between a
ﬁrm’s location, ﬁnancial structure and acquisition activities. Consistent with the Apache’s
experience, our model assumes that ﬁrms located in industry clusters have more acquisition
opportunities but also face greater competition from other potential acquirers. To take
advantage of these opportunities, the ﬁrms in our model maintain more ﬁnancial slack if
they are located in clusters, which allows them to bid more aggressively for acquisitions.2
We initially examine the model’s assumptions, and ﬁnd that after controlling for indus-
try aﬃliation, ﬁrms located in clusters do tend to make more acquisitions. In addition,
consistent with previous research (e.g., Hartford, 1999), we document that ﬁrms with more
1The above discussion is based on three Harvard Business Cases, (“MW Petroleum Corp. A” and “MW
Petroleum Corp. B” and “Risk Management at Apache”) and extensive discussions with Tom Chambers,
Apache’s Executive Vice President.
2This aspect of the model is related to Clayton and Ravid (2002) and Morellec and Zhdanov (2006),
which show that more levered bidders tend to bid less aggressively.
1ﬁnancial slack tend to make more acquisitions. Moreover, we show that the positive relation
between acquisition activity and ﬁnancial slack is stronger in clusters, which is consistent
with the presence of greater competition for targets in clusters.
While the evidence on the relation between location and acquisition activity supports
the assumptions of our model, the main focus of our empirical analysis is on the relation
between a ﬁrm’s choice of ﬁnancial slack and whether or not the ﬁrm is located in a cluster.
As we just discussed, our model focuses on an “acquisition” channel, which predicts a
positive relation between being located in a cluster and having ﬁnancial slack. However,
there is an existing literature that suggests a “collateral” channel, which generates the
opposite prediction. In particular, Williamson (1986) suggests that when ﬁrms have assets
that are redeployable, which is more likely to be the case when they are located in clusters,
they are able to obtain more debt ﬁnancing.3
To assess the importance of these competing theories we extend the literature on the
empirical determinants of capital structure, (e.g., Titman and Wessels 1988 and Rajan and
Zingales 1995) and cash holdings (e.g., Opler et al. 1999), by considering the eﬀects of
location proxies in the traditional regressions. Our results indicate that ﬁrms in clusters
have lower debt ratios and maintain higher cash balances. Our tests also show that ﬁrm
characteristics like size and proﬁtability, which are related to leverage and cash balances in
the cross-section, have a weaker eﬀect on these choices in clusters.
The empirical evidence in this paper–which rejects the null hypothesis that ﬁrms’ cor-
porate ﬁnance decisions are independent of location–can be interpreted in at least two
ways. First, the evidence is consistent with the idea that location aﬀects investment op-
portunities and that these in turn inﬂuence capital structure choices, (i.e., a direct cluster
eﬀect). Alternatively, these ﬁndings may reﬂect the possibility that ﬁrms that choose to
locate either within or outside of clusters have fundamentally diﬀerent characteristics (i.e.,
a cluster-selection eﬀect), and that these characteristics are related to both the tendency of
3Shleifer and Vishny (1992) also discusses how a liquid asset market increases the ability of ﬁrms to use
assets as collateral for loans. Myers and Rajan (1998), however, suggest a negative eﬀect of liquidity on
borrowing capacity that arises because a more liquid asset market makes it easier for ﬁrms to substitute
more risky assets for safe assets.
2ﬁrms to make acquisitions as well as their capital structure choices.4
In order to address the possibility that a cluster-selection eﬀect is driving our ﬁndings,
we perform the previously described tests on a sample of ﬁr m st h a th a v eb e e ni nag i v e n
location for more than ten years and ﬁnd that the relation between location and corporate
ﬁnance choices continues to hold.5 To the extent that the unobserved characteristics that
inﬂuence a ﬁrm’s location choice become less important over time, this evidence suggests
that the ﬁndings are determined more by a direct cluster eﬀect rather than by a cluster-
selection eﬀect.
Our ﬁnal tests examine other geographical characteristics that may also inﬂuence the
availability of growth opportunities (e.g., acquisition or other types) and thus may inﬂuence
the demand for ﬁnancial slack. Since location can inﬂuence a ﬁrm’s opportunities in a
variety of ways, it is of interest to consider other geographical characteristics that may also
be related to future opportunities, and examine how these characteristics are related to
ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing choices. Speciﬁcally, we consider both growing cities and cities with more
aggregate R&D expenditure and ﬁnd that in these areas–where growth opportunities are
likely to be more prevalent–ﬁrms maintain more ﬁnancial slack.6 We also ﬁnd that this
relation also holds for ﬁrms that have been in the same location for at least ten years.
By linking a ﬁrm’s location to its corporate ﬁnance decisions we contribute to two
distinct literatures. The ﬁrst is the literature in corporate ﬁnance that examines the relation
between investment opportunities and ﬁnancing choices. In this sense, our analysis is related
to Harford (1999), who showed that ﬁrms with more cash do more acquisitions. His empirical
tests are motivated by the theoretical literature that suggests that reduced ﬁnancial slack
c a nc u r baﬁrm’s ability to fund new investments (Myers 1977, Myers and Majluf 1984,
Jensen 1986, and Hart and Moore 1995). However, as is also recognized in this literature,
ﬁrms anticipating good investment opportunities have an incentive to maintain ﬁnancial
4For example, as shown in Almazan, de Motta and Titman (2007), clusters are likely to attract ﬁrms
with attributes that make them more likely to succeed.
5Even though ﬁrms may originally self-select into diﬀerent locations, their choice of location can be
considered almost permanent. For instance, Pirinsky and Wang (2006) who show that in the period 1992-97
less than 2.4% of ﬁrms in Compustat changed headquarters’ location.
6As suggested by the economic geography literature, this is consistent with the presence of innovation
spillovers for ﬁr m sl o c a t e di nt h es a m eg e o g r a p h i c a la r e a .
3slack, which suggests that the observed relation between cash holdings and acquisition
activity might arise because ﬁrms accumulate ﬁnancial slack when they have acquisition
opportunities. The current literature provides evidence of an eﬀect running from debt
choices to investment choices.7 In contrast, by comparing the capital structure choices of
ﬁrms with diﬀerent locations we develop tests that provide evidence of an eﬀect running
from investment opportunities to the choice of ﬁnancial slack.8
By using location as a proxy for acquisitions and other growth opportunities, this paper
also contributes to the economic geography literature that examines how location inﬂuences
corporate choices.9 For example, previous studies have shown that ﬁrms in urban clusters
are more likely to outsource (Ono 2003), to vertically disintegrate (Holmes 1999) and to
innovate (Glaeser et al.1992). Also, Landier et al. (2006) ﬁnd that geographic dispersion
within the ﬁrm aﬀects its labor and divestiture policies. Like our study, these papers
provide evidence that supports the idea that being located in industry clusters aﬀects ﬁrms’
behavior.10 Finally, the two papers that are most closely related to ours are Kedia et al.
(2007), which examines how physical proximity aﬀects the ability of ﬁrms to complete
acquisitions, and Loughran (2007), which ﬁnds that ﬁrms in rural areas issue equity less
often than otherwise similar urban ﬁrms.11
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a stylized model and
describes the empirical research motivated by it. Section 3 describes the data and considers
7For example, Lang, et al. (1996) argue that the overall debt choice of a conglomerate can be viewed
as exogenous with respect to the investment opportunities of the non-core division, and show that it is,
nevertheless, negatively related to the non-core divisions investment expenditures. See also Lamont (1997)
and Stein (2003) for an excellent review of this literature.
8Although the negative relation between market to book ratios (a commonly used proxy for growth op-
portunities) and debt ratios has been previously established, the direction of causation between opportunities
and ﬁnancial slack has not been fully resolved. Since cluster and city growth eﬀe c t sa r el i k e l yt ob ed i r e c t l y
related to growth opportunities, but can be viewed as exogenous with respect to the ﬁrm’s capital structure
choice, the documented relation between geography and ﬁnancial slack is likely to arise from the eﬀect that
the presence of potential opportunities produces on a ﬁrm’s desire to maintain ﬁnancial slack.
9Issues relating to ﬁrm location and industrial clustering have been discussed by economists since Marshall
(1890). See Fujita, Krugman and Venables (2001), Fujita and Thisse (2002), Duranton and Puga (2003)
and Rosenthal and Strange (2003) for recent reviews of this literature..
10Better input sharing (e.g., Holmes 1999), labor market pooling (e.g., Diamond and Simon 1990, Costa
and Kahn 1990, Krugman 1991, Dumais et al. 1997, and Almazan et al. 2007), and higher knowledge
spillovers (e.g., Jaﬀee et al. 1993) have been suggested as leading forces of agglomeration economies.
11In contrast to Loughram’s ﬁndings, however, we show that after controlling for a ﬁrm’s physical proximity
to its competitors there is a relatively weak but positive relation between the size of the urban area and
debt ratios.
4some descriptive evidence. Sections 4 and 5 present the main empirical results. Finally,
section 6 presents our conclusions.
2 Empirical research design
2.1 A simple model
This section presents a simple model that motivates our empirical tests. The model is based
on the idea that ﬁrms can ﬁnd it useful to have ﬁnancial slack when they are likely to have
to compete for acquisitions.
The model includes two periods, t =0 ,1, and two potential acquirers, i.e., ﬁrms 1 and
2. At t =0ﬁrm i (i =1 ,2) sets its leverage ratio, 0 ≤ di ≤ 1. At t = 1, with probability γ,
ﬁrms have the opportunity to make an acquisition, and engage in a second-price sealed bid
auction for the target. The value created by such an acquisition depends on the synergy si
with the target, which is known to the ﬁrm at t = 1 but unknown at t = 0. We assume
that synergies are independent and uniformly distributed on the interval [¯ s−1/2, ¯ s+1/2],
where ¯ s ≥ 1/2.
We make three assumptions regarding the eﬀects of leverage. First, we assume that
debt is risk-free, which allows us to abstract from wealth transfers between debt-holders
and equity-holders that can arise in acquisitions. Second, we assume that leverage reduces
the funds that a ﬁrm can raise to ﬁnance an acquisition. In particular, we assume that
ﬁrm i can raise funds up to (v + si − ρdi) to make the acquisition, where v is the value
of the target as a stand alone, i.e., without the synergies, and ρ ∈ (0,1/2) is a measure
of the ﬁnancial constraints that debt creates.12 With this speciﬁcation, a ﬁrm’s ability to
raise funds increases in the value of the target with the synergy (v + si) and decreases in
its leverage ratio di. Furthermore, for simplicity we focus on the case where ¯ s>1/2+ρ,
which ensures that si − ρdi ≥ 0 for any potential synergy realization and choice of debt.
When this assumption holds, all targets are ultimately acquired.13 Third, we assume that,
12The assumption ρ<1/2 ensures that program (2) is concave and that its ﬁrst order condition, i.e.,
equation (3) below, characterizes the global optimum.
13Since the minimum realization of the synergy is si =¯ s−1/2 and the maximum choice of debt is di =1 ,
assuming ¯ s>1/2+ρ implies si − ρdi > 0f o ra l lsi, di. Considering the alternative case where debt can
impede acquisitions when the realized synergy is small, i.e., v − si − ρdi < 0, complicates the presentation
but does not aﬀect the main intuitions obtained from the analysis. For brevity, we omit these additional
5besides its eﬀects on acquisitions, debt generates some net beneﬁts on ﬁrm value, τdi.W e
refer to τ as the “non-M&A” debt beneﬁts.14
To solve the model, we proceed by backward induction and obtain the bidding strategy
at t = 1 in the event that an acquisition opportunity arises. Speciﬁcally, when this is true,
each ﬁrm i bids bi = v + si − ρdi and acquires the target for bj if bi >b j (for j =1 ,2a n d
j 6= i).
At t =0 , ﬁrm i sets its leverage ratio di taking into account the eﬀe c tt h a tl e v e r a g ew i l l
have on its ability to acquire potential targets at t = 1. In particular, ﬁrm i solves:
max
di
τdi + γE(v + si − bj|bi >b j)Pr(bi >b j). (1)











(si − sj + ρdj)dsi
!
dsj, (2)
where s∗ ≡ min{¯ s+ 1
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The following result follows directly from equation (3):
Result 1 The optimal debt ratio, d∗
i, is lower when:












derivations which are available from the authors upon request.
14For instance if, per dollar of debt, τ1 > 0 is the savings on taxes and τ2 < 0t h ei n c r e a s e so nﬁnancial
distress costs, we are considering a case in which the net beneﬁts of debt are positive i.e., τ1 − τ2 = τ>0.
15The limits of integration s
∗ and s
∗∗ capture the fact that for certain realizations of s1 and s2 competition
between ﬁrms can be limited because of their diﬀerences in leverage. For example, if v =0 ,ρ =0 .25, d1 =0 .2
and d2 =0 .4 then, s
∗ =¯ s +
1
2 and s
∗∗ ≡ max{s2 − 0.05, ¯ s −
1
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2, ﬁrm 1 makes the acquisition regardless of its realized synergy. This occurs because even
for the smallest possible synergy s1 =¯ s −
1
2 ﬁrm 1 bids more than 2, i.e., b1 =( ¯ s −
1
2) − 0.05 >b 2.H e n c e ,
if s2 < (¯ s −
1
2)+0 .05 then s
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1
2 and s1 ∈ [¯ s −
1
2, ¯ s +
1
2].





i −dj|) which becomes (3) under symmetry. A symmetric interior
solution requires τ<γ ρ
2.
6In addition, equation (3) has the following implications about the sensitivity of debt to its
determinants:
Result 2 The sensitivity of debt to the non-M&A debt beneﬁts (i.e.,
dd∗
i
dτ ), is lower when:








To clarify the predictions stated in Result 2 it is illustrative to consider an example where
the non-M&A debt beneﬁts are aﬀected by two factors, e.g., taxes and costs of ﬁnancial
distress: τ = τ1 + τ2,w h e r eτ1 > 0 >τ 2. The previous result suggests that the empirical
importance of τi is ameliorated in situations where debt has a greater inﬂuence on the ability





¯ ¯ ¯ =
¯ ¯ ¯ 1
γρ2
¯ ¯ ¯ is decreasing in γ and ρ. Intuitively, while a reduction in the cost of ﬁnancial
distress (or an increase in the tax beneﬁts of debt) tend to increase leverage, this eﬀect is
weaken when having ﬁnancial ﬂexibility is important (e.g., when acquisition opportunities
are more likely to arise).
2.2 Empirical implementation
Following insights from the literature on Economic Geography we conjecture that ﬁrms in
clusters have more opportunities to make acquisitions which are subject to competition, i.e.,
ah i g h e rγ in the model above. While our theory suggests that debt has a negative eﬀect
on competition and thus strictly applies to the acquisitions subject to competition, in our
empirical analysis, we start by examining the diﬀerences in acquisition activities (i.e., total
number of acquisitions) of ﬁrms inside and outside clusters.17 Speciﬁcally we examine the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 Firms in clusters make more acquisitions than ﬁrms located outside clusters.
In addition, we examine whether leverage has a negative eﬀect on the ability to make
acquisitions, and whether this eﬀect is particularly strong for ﬁrms in clusters.18 Notice,
17A larger γ can stem from either a larger number of acquisition opportunities, or a larger degree of
competition for those opportunities.
18Notice that, if there is more competitive acquisitions in clusters (a higher γ), ﬁr m si nc l u s t e r sw i l lw a n t
more ﬁnancial ﬂexibility. See Hypothesis 3 below.
7however, that leverage is an endogenous variable in our model and hence, one must interpret
the empirical relation between leverage and ﬁrms’ acquisition activity as stemming from
exogenous shocks in leverage. Formally, this eﬀect is described by the partial derivative
of debt on the probability of making an acquisition evaluated at the equilibrium. In our
model, such probability is given by Pi = γ Pr(bi >b j), and ∂Pi
∂di = −γρ, which is decreasing
in γ and ρ.19 If we assume that γ is larger in clusters hypothesis 2 follows.
Hypothesis 2 The negative eﬀect of leverage on acquisitions is stronger in clusters.
Our third hypothesis is about the eﬀect of ﬁrm’s location on its leverage. We start from
(3) and consider two eﬀects of clusters in the parameters of the model:
1. According to Williamson (1988), we assume that in clusters ﬁrms have better op-
portunities to redeploy their assets, which implies a positive shift in the non-M&A
beneﬁts of debt (i.e., an increase in τ). Speciﬁcally, we postulate the following linear
formulation to incorporate the redeployability eﬀects:








i } are the determinants of the non-M&A net beneﬁts of debt, {βj} are the
coeﬃcients of these determinants of leverage, Clusteri is a dummy variable that takes
a value of 1 if the ﬁrm is located within an industry cluster and βc > 0r e p r e s e n t st h e
positive shift in τ for clustered ﬁrms.20
2. Consistent with our conjecture that ﬁrms in clusters encounter more acquisitions
opportunities, we consider the following formulation:
δi = μ + μcClusteri (5)
where μc > 0 measure the additional acquisition eﬀects on clusters.
19Pr(bi >b j)=1− sj + ρ(dj − di)a n d
∂ Pr(bi>bj)
∂di = ρ.
20As described below, Clusteri takes a value of 1 when a ﬁrm’s headquarters is located in a MSA with
ten or more ﬁrms in the same three-digit SIC and 0 otherwise.
8Substituting (4) and (5) in d∗










i + εi. (6)
Since Clusteri is a dummy variable, the previous speciﬁcation can be re-written as:








φj · (1 − λ)(K
j
i × Clusteri)+εi, (7)
where the correspondence between φ’s and the parameters in equation (6) follows from
the comparison of expressions (6) and (7).21 Notice that, while a priori the net eﬀect of
clusters on leverage is ambiguous, the higher likelihood of acquisitions in clusters μc > 0i s
a necessary condition for ﬁrms in clusters to have lower leverage. This condition, however,
is not suﬃcient since ﬁrms in clusters may choose to have more leverage due to the higher
redeployability of their assets (i.e., φc is positive only when μc >
γβc
α ).
Hypothesis 3 When the acquisition eﬀect is suﬃciently strong (i.e., μc >
γβc
α ), ﬁrms in
clusters will exhibit lower leverage (i.e., φc < 0).
Finally, our fourth and last hypothesis relates to the determinants of leverage inside and
outside of clusters. As shown in equation (7), for each determinant of leverage Kj,t h er a t i o
of the coeﬃcients for ﬁrms inside and outside of clusters is constant and equal to λ.N o t i c e
that λ<1( i . e . ,λ ≡
μ
μ+μc) captures the amelioration eﬀe c td e s c r i b e di nR e s u l t2 .
Hypothesis 4 The ratio of estimates of the determinants of leverage for ﬁrms inside versus
outside clusters is constant and smaller than 1 (i.e., λ<1).
3 Data and sample characteristics
We examine ﬁrms covered in Compustat and CRSP from 1990 to 2005. Since we are
interested in considering ﬁrms with a well deﬁn e dl o c a t i o n( i . e . ,ﬁrms with a high percentage
of their assets and employees located at the ﬁrm’s corporate headquarters) we exclude





(μ+μc)ρ2 − φ0, φj ≡
βj
γρ2 and λ ≡
μ
μ+μc.
9manufacturing ﬁrms. Furthermore, because manufacturing industries are likely to exhibit
national-wide product market competition, in the interpretation of our results, we abstract
from product market competition eﬀects associated to diﬀerences in ﬁrms’ locations.22
Speciﬁcally, we consider ﬁrms with primary three digit SIC between 200 and 399 and
ﬁrms in SIC 737 (Computer Programming, and Data Processing).23 Our data set also
excludes: (1) ﬁrms in Hawaii and Puerto Rico; (2) ﬁrms with sales less than $50 million
(in 1990 dollars); and (3) three-digit SIC industries that have less than 10 ﬁrms in any of
t h es a m p l ey e a r s .T h eﬁnal sample includes 21 industries, 16 years, 1,910 ﬁrms and 13,342
ﬁrm-year observations. Approximately 80% of our sample belongs to ﬁrms classiﬁed in SIC
200-399 (manufacturing) and the rest to ﬁrms in SIC 737. Variables are windsorized at the
bottom and top 1% to limit the eﬀect of outliers.
We focus on the geographical location of ﬁrms’ headquarters, where location is deﬁned
by the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) as speciﬁed in the 1990 Census. When the
ﬁrm’s headquarters are not located in an MSA we consider the county of location instead.
With this information, for each ﬁrm-year, we construct three measures of industry clustering
based on the geographical proximity of ﬁrms’ headquarters: (i) The number ﬁrms with the
same three-digit SIC that are located in a given MSA, NumberofFirms in MSA,24 (ii) the
number of ﬁrms within the same industry in an MSA divided by the total number of ﬁrms
within the same industry, Ratio of Firms in MSA, and (iii) a dummy variable, Cluster,t h a t
takes a value of 1 for ﬁrm-years in which a ﬁrm’s headquarters is located within an MSA
that has ten or more ﬁrms with the same three-digit SIC and 0 otherwise. According to
this third deﬁnition, 41% of the observations correspond to ﬁrms located inside an industry
cluster. The median number of ﬁrms in the same industry within an MSA, NumberofFirms
in MSA, in our sample is six.25
22This is consistent with Glaeser and Kohlhase (2003) who reports that transportation costs for manufac-
turing goods have fallen by over 90% in the last century, and argues that ”the world is better characterized
as a place where it is essentially free to move goods.”
23Most SIC 737 ﬁrms manufacture products (e.g., Microsoft Windows) rather than provide a service.
24To facilitate the presentation, in the regressions we divide NumberofFirms in MSA by ten so that the
coeﬃcient measures the eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s eo ft e nﬁrms in a given location. (The standard deviation of
NumberofFirms in MSA is 25.) We have also run regressions using the logarithm of the number of ﬁrms
located in the same location as the explanatory variable and ﬁnd consistent results.
25W h i l ew er e q u i r et h a tt h eﬁrm has at least $50 million in sales to be part of our sample, both cluster
measures consider all the ﬁrms that are included in Compustat in a given year even if their sales are less
than $50 million.
10On average, there are 1.93 clusters per industry (i.e.,M S A sw i t ha tl e a s tt e nﬁrms in
that industry). There is, however, substantial variation across industries. For instance,
Computer Related Services Industry (SIC 737) has seven clusters in 1990, 19 clusters in
1999, and 11 clusters in 2005. In 1999, 80% of the ﬁrms in this industry were located in an
industry cluster. In contrast, Bottled Drinks (SIC 208) does not have any cluster during our
sample period.26 On average, each MSA has 0.71 industry clusters, but there is signiﬁcant
variation across MSAs. For example, New York City hosts eight industry clusters in 1990,
seven in 1994 and ﬁve in 2005. In contrast, Albuquerque did not have any industry clusters
during our sample period.
Table I provides descriptive statistics of the ﬁrms in the sample for a number of vari-
ables of interest. It reports ﬁrm mean values (i.e., Mean Values)a n dﬁrm mean values
after subtracting industry means (i.e., Industry Adjusted Mean Values)f o rﬁrms inside and
outside clusters. According to these ﬁgures, while ﬁr m si nc l u s t e r sa r en o tm o r ep r o ﬁtable
than ﬁrms outside clusters, they have lower book and market leverage, hold more cash,
have higher debt ratings, and pay dividends less often than ﬁrms outside clusters.27 In ad-
dition, ﬁr m si nc l u s t e r sd om o r eR & D ,h a v eh i g h e rMarkettoBook ratios, have less tangible
assets, and are slightly smaller (as measured by their volume of sales). With the exception
of size, these diﬀerences between clustered and non-clustered ﬁrms remain signiﬁcant after
subtracting the industry means, and hence they cannot be fully explained by the fact that
industries exhibit diﬀerent tendencies to cluster. Finally, the descriptive statistics show
that clusters tend to be in larger MSAs, which suggest the need to control for the size of
the MSA in our regressions.
4 Mergers, acquisitions and cluster location
This section presents evidence that relates a ﬁrm’s location to its acquisition activity. The
analysis provides descriptive statistics on acquisition activity followed by a multivariate
analysis. Our sample includes all completed acquisitions on the Securities Data Corpora-
tion’s (SDC) U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions Database from 1990 to 2005 where: (1) the
26Ellison and Glaeser (1997) document that while some industries exhibit high concentration, most indus-
tries are only slightly concentrated.
27Details on the deﬁnition and construction of the variables are reported in the Data Appendix.
11acquirer is covered by Compustat and belongs to a manufacturing or computer services in-
dustry (SIC 200-399 and 737); (2) data on the county and state of the acquirer is available;
(3) the transaction is classiﬁed as a merger or an acquisition of majority interest by SDC;
and (4) the value of the transaction is more than $10 million, and it represents more than
1% of the acquirer’s total assets. I nag i v e ny e a r ,w ec l a s s i f yaﬁrm as an acquirer if it
makes at least one acquisition and as a non-acquirer otherwise. We also record the dollar
volume of transactions made by each ﬁrm during the year.
Table II provides descriptive statistics for all acquisitions (Panel A), as well as for ac-
quisitions of public targets (Panel B). While the implications of the analysis correspond
more closely to the total acquisition activity of a ﬁrm, documenting the evidence on public
targets is also of interest since the more stringent disclosure requirements aﬀecting public
acquisitions are likely to translate into better quality data.28 In particular, Table II con-
ﬁrms that ﬁrms inside vis-` a-vis outside clusters: (i) are more likely to acquire another ﬁrm
(i.e., 0.192 vs. 0.144); (ii) are more likely to acquire another public ﬁrms (i.e., 0.063 vs.
0.034); (iii) make more acquisitions per year (i.e., 0.251 vs. 0.175); and (iv) make more
public acquisitions per year (i.e., 0.071 vs. 0.036). Furthermore, these eﬀects are propor-
tionally more pronounced for local transactions, suggesting that having targets in the same
geographical area facilitates the acquisition process. Finally, Table II also documents that
the value of a ﬁrm’s acquisitions as a percentage of its total assets is larger in clusters than
outside clusters (i.e., for all acquisitions is 7.3% vs. 4.4%, and for acquisitions of public
targets is 2.5% vs. 1.1%).29
Table III reports the results of the multivariate analysis. Regressions (1) to (4) relate
industrial clustering to the probability of making an acquisition (regressions (1) and (3)
consider all acquisitions, and regressions (2) and (4) restrict the analysis to acquisition of
public targets).30 Regressions (1) and (2) indicate that the eﬀect of a ﬁrm’s location on its
28A number of studies have raised doubts on the comprehensiveness and accuracy of the SDC database,
caveats that are likely to aﬀe c tt h ei n f o r m a t i o no nn o n - p u b l i ca c q uisitions. See for instance Boone and
Mulherin (2007) and references therein.
29The ﬁnding that clustering facilitates M&A transactions is also consistent with existing evidence that
geographic proximity facilitates input sharing (e.g., Holmes 1999), labor market pooling (e.g., Diamond and
Simon 1990, Dumais et al. 1997, and Costa and Kahn 1990) and knowledge spillovers (e.g., Jaﬀee et al.
1993, and Audretsch and Feldman, 1996).
30The reported regressions in columns (1) to (4) correspond to linear probability models. We also run a
12acquisition activity remains statistically signiﬁcant after controlling for year and industry
dummies (and hence, for the possibility that more acquisitive industries will exhibit a greater
tendency to cluster). This eﬀect is economically signiﬁcant: one standard deviation increase
in the number of ﬁrms (i.e., 25 ﬁrms) raises the probability of making an acquisition by 1.5
percentage points, which is approximately a 10% increase. This ﬁnding, together with the
evidence from Table II, provides support to our conjecture that ﬁrms in clusters are more
acquisitive, i.e., Hypothesis 1.
In columns (3) and (4), we include a measure of the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial slack (Net Market
Leverage), and the interaction between this measure and our proxy for cluster (Number of
Firms in MSA × Net Market Leverage). In addition, the regressions include the following
controls: ﬁrm size (Sales in logs), proﬁtability (EBITDA/TA), ﬁrm’s stock return (Aver-
age Stock Return), ﬁrm age (Age), city size (Population in logs), and year and industry
dummies. The net market leverage coeﬃcient in this regression is consistent with Hartford
(1999), which shows that ﬁnancial slack increases a ﬁrm’s acquisition activity. Moreover,
the regressions indicate that the negative eﬀect of leverage on acquisitions is stronger in
clusters (i.e., the interaction term is negative and signiﬁcant).31 The eﬀect is signiﬁcant
despite the fact that in many acquisitions the choice of payment is not cash, which sug-
gests that having a liquid balance sheet might be important for strategic reasons during the
bidding process.32
The stronger negative eﬀect of debt in clusters is consistent with the idea that ﬁrms in
clusters are more likely to lose out on attractive acquisitions when they have insuﬃcient
slack. Given this interpretation, as our model illustrates, ﬁrms in clusters ﬁnd it desirable
to maintain more ﬁnancial slack in anticipation of acquisition opportunities. However, given
the feedback from acquisition opportunities to the choice of ﬁnancial slack, these regressions
should be interpreted with some caution.33
probit analysis and obtain very similar results. Also, for brevity, we report the results by using Numberof
Firms in MSA as the proxy for clustering. Qualitatively similar (but less strong) results are obtained with
our alternative clustering proxies.
31We have also run separate regressions for ﬁrms inside and outside clusters and found that in clusters
Net Market Leverage has a larger negative eﬀect on acquisitions.
32These strategic considerations, as illustrated in our model, are particularly important when the bidding
process is competitive as it is more likely to be in clusters.
33Ideally, this endogeneity concern should be addressed with instruments for debt. We did estimate this
model with instrumental variables, but because of a lack of good instruments our results were inconclusive.
13In columns (5) to (8) we relate ﬁrm location to the value of the acquisitions (rather
than to the number of acquisitions) using Tobit regressions. The results are consistent with
our earlier results and can be summarized as follows: there is evidence that the transaction
volume is larger in clusters, that leverage reduces the transaction volume, and that the
negative eﬀect of leverage is stronger in clusters. Overall, the multivariate results are
consistent with our Hypotheses 1 and 2:r e l a t i v et oﬁrms outside clusters, ﬁrm in clusters
are more acquisitive and their acquisition activity is more strongly aﬀected by leverage.
5 Financial structure and cluster location
This section explores the relation between a ﬁrm’s location and its capital structure. As we
discussed earlier, location can aﬀect a ﬁrm’s capital structure choice through two channels.
The ﬁrst channel, related to the arguments in Williamson (1986) and Shleifer and Vishny
(1992), is that ﬁrms will have greater debt capacity if their assets are more easily redeploy-
able. Hence, if ﬁrms in clusters can redeploy (e.g., sell) their assets more easily, they should
also have higher debt ratios. The second channel suggest that ﬁrms may want to have more
ﬁnancial slack to take advantage of potential growth opportunities. These opportunities can
arise, as we illustrate in our model, in the form of more competitive acquisition opportuni-
ties (which are more likely to arise in clusters),34 or, as we discuss in section 5.4, as other
types of growth opportunities. Therefore, while the collateral channel implies that ﬁrms in
clusters will be more highly levered, the acquisition (or growth opportunity) channel implies
that ﬁrms in clusters will maintain more ﬁnancial slack.
5.1 Leverage regressions
Table IV examines the relation between capital structure and cluster location after con-
trolling for other determinants of capital structure previously identiﬁed in the literature.
In particular, we regress three measures of leverage (i.e., book, market, and net market
leverage) on the following variables: (i)am e a s u r eo fc l u s t e r i n g ;( ii) ﬁrm size (Sales in
logs); (iii)p r o ﬁtability (EBITDA/TA); (iv) Market to Book,( v) asset tangibility (Tangible
Assets/TA); (vi) R&D expenses (R&D/TA); (vii)t h eﬁrm’s average stock returns in the
34Notice that the evidence in section 4, which shows that the negative of leverage on the ﬁrms’ acquisition
activity is particularly strong in clusters, is consistent with the acquisition eﬀect.
14last three years (Average Stock Return); (viii)ac o n t r o lf o rt h es i z eo ft h eM S Ai nw h i c h
the ﬁrm is located (Population in logs); and (ix) industry and year dummies.35 We run
separate regressions for each of our three diﬀerent measures of clustering: NumberofFirms
in MSA, Ratio of Firms in MSA and Cluster.36
The results in Table IV show that even after controlling for other factors previously
identiﬁed as determinants of leverage, ﬁr m si nc l u s t e r sh a v elower debt ratios than ﬁrms
outside clusters.37 The eﬀect is both statistically and economically signiﬁcant. For instance,
ﬁrms located in clusters exhibit market leverage and net market leverage ratios that are,
respectively, 2.0 and 4.9 percentage points smaller than those of ﬁrms located outside clus-
ters. Since the average net market leverage in our sample is 22.7%, this represents more
than a 20% reduction from the average ﬁrm in the sample. The results are robust across
diﬀerent measures of clustering and leverage, and the coeﬃcients of other determinants of
leverage previously identiﬁed are all signiﬁcant and have the expected sign. These ﬁndings
support Hypothesis 3 and document systematic geographical eﬀects in Corporate Finance.
These regressions can help us interpret the negative relation between debt ratios and
acquisitions documented in the previous section. Such a negative relation could be because
ﬁrms with more opportunities maintain ﬁnancial slack, as we illustrate in our model, or
alternatively as suggested by Jensen (1986), managers may simply ﬁnd it easier to exploit
these opportunities when they have ﬁnancial slack. However, to the extent that cluster
location proxies for acquisition and growth opportunities, one can interpret the results as
indicating that ﬁrms with greater opportunities maintain lower debt ratios.38
Table V presents a second set of regressions corresponding to the leverage model pro-
posed in equation (7). These regressions estimate a constant λ that multiplies the estimates
35We also include a dummy variable, R&D Dummy, that takes a value of 1 for ﬁrm-year observations
in which R&D is not reported. The following control variables are lagged for one ﬁscal year: Sales,
EBITDA/TA, Market to Book, Tangible Assets/TA,a n dR&D/TA .
36We have also run regressions with the logarithm of ﬁrms in an MSA as an independent variable and
found very similar results.
37Notice that our speciﬁcation is similar to Rajan and Zingales’ (1995) except that we also include a proxy
for clustering (NumberofFirms in MSA or Cluster) and three additional controls: R&D/TA, Population,
and Average Stock Return. In controlling for past stock returns we follow Welch (2005) who shows that a
ﬁrm’s past stock return can be an important determinant of its leverage ratio. In separate regressions we
have also included Selling Expenses/Sales and Firm Age and got almost identical results.
38Notice that this interpretation relies on the exogeneity of a ﬁrm’s location. Section 5.3 addresses the
ﬁrm’s location choice.
15of the determinants of leverage inside and outside of industry clusters. Our hypothesis is
that there is an amelioration eﬀect in clusters (i.e., λ<1), which means that when the
estimation does not take into account the additional importance of having ﬁnancial ﬂexi-
bility in clusters, the determinants of capital structure may appear to be empirically less
i m p o r t a n ti nc l u s t e r s .( N o t i c et h a ti fλ = 1 is imposed, this non-linear speciﬁcation would
be equivalent to the one reported in Table IV.) Speciﬁcally, Table V reports the NLLS
estimation of equation (7) where di corresponds to each of the measures of leverage, and
K
j
i are the above described control variables (i.e., (i) through (viii)).
The results in Table V document the presence of an amelioration eﬀect in the market
leverage regressions. For instance, in the net market leverage regression λ =0 .636, i.e., the
eﬀect of the determinants of capital structure is ameliorated by 36.4% in clusters. In addition
to the amelioration eﬀect, Table V also conﬁrms the negative eﬀect of cluster on leverage (for
three of the four regressions Cluster is negatively related to ﬁrm leverage). Overall, these
results support Hypothesis 4: consistent with the extra importance of ﬁnancial ﬂexibility
in clusters, we observe a reduced eﬀect of the other determinants of capital structure in
clustered ﬁrms.
5.2 Cash regressions
From a comparison between the leverage and the net leverage regressions, it can be inferred
that ﬁrms in clusters vis-a-vis outside clusters tend to hold more cash. In this section we
explore the relation between ﬁrm location and cash holdings in more detail.39 Similar to our
analysis of location and leverage, we estimate two types of regressions. First, we estimate
OLS regressions that examine how location aﬀects a ﬁrm’s cash holdings after controlling
for the usual determinants of cash. Speciﬁcally, we regress the ratio of cash and marketable
securities to total assets minus cash, Cash/nTA, and its logarithm, Log(Cash/nTA),o no u r
measures of clustering (NumberofFirms in MSA, Ratio of Firms in MSA, or Cluster)a n d
the following controls:40 (i) Sales (in logs, a control for ﬁrm size); (ii) Market to Book (a
39See Opler et al., (1999), Dittmar et al., (2003), Acharya et al., (2005), Harford et al. (2005) and Foley
et al., (2007) for papers that examine ﬁrms’ decisions to hold cash.
40Both cash variables i.e., Cash/nTA and log(Cash/nTA) are constructed by substracting cash balances
from total assets. This is for consistency with the literature e.g., Foley et al. (2007). Identical results are
obtained when cash balances are not substracted from total assets.
16proxy for investment opportunities); (iii) R&D/TA (a proxy for expected costs of ﬁnancial
distress); (iv) Capital Exp/TA (a proxy for the ﬁrms’ investment needs); (v) Debt Rating,
a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the ﬁrm has long term debt rated by S&P and of 0
otherwise (a proxy for the costs of accessing ﬁnancial markets); (vi) Dividend, a dummy
that takes a value of 1 if the ﬁrm pays dividends in that year and 0 ( to account for ability
to raise funds by reducing dividends); (vii) Cash Flow Std. Dev. (a measure of cash ﬂow
volatility); (viii) Average Stock Return, the ﬁrm’s average stock returns in the last three
years; (ix) Population in logs, (a control for the size of the MSA in which the ﬁrm is located);
and (x) industry and year dummies.41
The OLS regressions reported in Table VI, columns (1) through (6), indicate that af-
ter controlling for other variables previously identiﬁed as determinants of cash holdings,
Cash/nTA is 13.7 percentage points higher for ﬁrms in clusters.42 Since ﬁrms in the sample
have, on average, 32.3% Cash/nTA, the cluster eﬀect represents 42% increase of the aver-
age ﬁrm cash holdings. The eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant, and robust across the diﬀerent
measures of clustering and of cash balances. Among the controls, Sales and Capital Exp/TA
decrease cash holdings while Market to Book, R&D/TA, CashFlowStd.Dev and Average
Stock Return increase cash balances.
We also estimate a non-linear model similar to the one proposed by (7) and estimated
in Table V:








φj · (1 − λ)(K
j
i × Clusteri)+εi (8)
where K
j
i are the above described control variables (i.e., (i)t h r o u g h( x)). As in the lever-
age regressions from Table V, the estimate of λ will allow us to test for the presence of the
amelioration eﬀect (i.e., λ<1). The NLLS estimation of equation (8), which is reported in
column (7), conﬁrms that ﬁrms in clusters hold more cash. In addition, it shows that there
is a signiﬁcant amelioration eﬀect in the determinants of cash holdings in clusters. Speciﬁ-
cally, the amelioration eﬀect, which is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level, represents a
41Controls (i)t h r o u g h( vii) are those considered in Foley et al. (2007) and, as in their analysis, they are
lagged for one ﬁscal year. As in the leverage regressions, we set R&D equal to zero if the R&D value is not
reported and include a dummy variable for these observations, i.e., R&DD u m m y .
42This value is obtained from regression (5), the speciﬁcation where Cash/nTA is used as the dependent
variable and Cluster is used as the clustering measure.
17reduction of 26.2% (i.e., λ =0 .738) in the coeﬃcients of the determinants of cash holdings
in clusters. Overall, the ﬁndings in this section are consistent with the previous results on
leverage and with Hypothesis 3 and 4,a n dc o n ﬁrm the importance of geographical location
on ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial decisions.
5.3 The choice of location
Our results, up to this point, can be summarized as follows: Firms in clusters (1) make more
acquisitions; (2) have acquisition activities that are more negatively aﬀected by leverage;
( 3 )h a v em o r eﬁnancial slack (i.e., less leverage and more cash); and (4) are less sensitive
to the usual determinants of ﬁnancial slack. These ﬁndings reject the null hypothesis that
ﬁrm’s corporate ﬁnance decisions are independent of location and, to the extent that loca-
tion choices are exogenous with respect to the ﬁrm’s capital structure choice, support the
hypothesis that ﬁrms maintain ﬁnancial slack when they anticipate acquisition opportuni-
ties.
A potential concern is that ﬁrms with better growth and acquisition opportunities as
well as more ﬁnancial slack, choose to locate in clusters.43 This cluster-selection eﬀect can
potentially be a serious issue for young ﬁrms, that have recently chosen their locations.44
However, to the extent that the unobserved characteristics that may inﬂuence a ﬁrm’s
location choice become less important over time, the observed eﬀect on capital structures of
older ﬁrms which chose locations many years ago, is unlikely to arise because of a cluster-
selection eﬀect. For this reason it is interesting to explore whether the relation between
capital structure and location for older ﬁrms is indeed consistent with what we observe for
the entire sample.
In Table VII we present regressions that replicate our previous analysis but on a sample
of ﬁrms that have been public for at least 10 years. As was the case in the full sample, our
regressions indicate that ﬁrms in clusters make more acquisitions and that leverage reduces
43A large literature has examined the incentives of ﬁrms to locate in clusters. For instance Almazan, de
Motta and Titman (2007) show that clusters are likely to attract ﬁrms with attributes that make them more
likely to succeed.
44Indeed, Pirinsky and Wang (2006) document that from 1992 to 1997 less than 2.4% of ﬁrms in Compustat
moved its headquarters from one MSA to another (i.e., 118 out of 5,000 ﬁrms did so).
18the tendency to make acquisitions more in clusters (the coeﬃcient of the interaction term
between Net Market Leverage and Number of Firms in MSA is signiﬁcantly negative also
for older ﬁrms). In addition, older ﬁrms in clusters have lower leverage and larger cash
balances than older ﬁrms outside clusters. As in the full sample case, these results are both
economically and statistically signiﬁcant. Furthermore, these eﬀects are not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent for the older ﬁrms. For instance, a one standard deviation increase in the number
of ﬁrms, that is, 25 ﬁrms, decreases the net market leverage by 2.25 percentage points in the
full-sample case (see Table IV), and by 2.75 percentage points in the sample of older ﬁrms
(Table VII panel b). Overall, the consistency of the eﬀects between older ﬁrms and the
entire sample suggests that the results are likely to be generated by direct cluster eﬀects.
5.4 Location, growth opportunities and ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial slack
Up to this point our focus has been on the greater acquisition opportunities in clusters, and
how this inﬂuences the demand for ﬁnancial slack. Our focus on clusters is motivated by
the economic geography literature that suggests that opportunities may be more available
to ﬁrms that are located close to their industry peers, for instance, due to the importance of
input sharing and resource pooling. In contrast, our focus on acquisitions is motivated by
data considerations. Since acquisitions must be reported publicly, they provide an observ-
able example of a growth opportunity that may inﬂuence a ﬁrm’s desire to hold ﬁnancial
slack.
In reality, however, location can inﬂuence a ﬁrm’s opportunities in a variety of ways,
so in practice it is diﬃcult to pin down the speciﬁc channel through which location inﬂu-
ences the demand for ﬁnancial slack.45 For this reason it is of interest to consider other
geographical characteristics that may also be related to future opportunities, and examine
how these characteristics are related to ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing choices. In this section we con-
sider R&D expenditures within an MSA, which we measure by the ratio of the aggregate
R&D expenditures to the aggregate ﬁrms’ total assets in the MSA (MSA R&D/MSA TA),
as a measure of the regional business climate. If, as discussed in the economic geogra-
phy literature, innovation has spillover eﬀects, it is likely that high R&D cities generate
45As documented above, location eﬀects on ﬁnancial slack (both in leverage and cash) are substantial,
which suggests that acquisitions are only a manifestation of a more general eﬀect.
19opportunities for ﬁrms that go beyond what one might expect given their ﬁrm speciﬁcc h a r -
acteristics (e.g., their own R&D expenditures). Similarly, there may be more opportunities
in growing cities, which would also indicate a positive relation between ﬁnancial slack and
MSA growth (Population Growth).46
The results in Table VIII document a signiﬁcant relation between these regional char-
acteristics (MSA R&D/MSA TA and Population Growth) and capital structure choices.
Speciﬁcally, ﬁrms in high R&D and growing MSAs have lower leverage and hold more cash,
which is consistent with the idea that these urban characteristics are associated with greater
future business opportunities.47 The eﬀect is economically signiﬁcant. For instance, a 5%
increase in MSA R&D/MSA TA, (i.e., one standard deviation), reduces ﬁrms’ net market
leverage ratio by 3 percentage points, a 13% reduction from the average net market lever-
age in the sample. Furthermore, after controlling for these eﬀects, the eﬀect of cluster on
ﬁnancial slack continues to be statistically and economically signiﬁcant (i.e., the coeﬃcient
estimates for Number of Firms in the MSA and Ratio of Firms in the MSA in Table VII are
very similar to those obtained in Tables IV and VI).48 Overall, the eﬀect of these regional
characteristics on debt ratios and cash are consistent with ﬁrms maintaining ﬁnancial slack
in anticipation of future growth opportunities (acquisition or otherwise).
6C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
As we mentioned in the introduction, there is a growing economic geography literature
that describes how a ﬁrm’s location can be related to a number of its choices. This paper
contributes to that literature by documenting that ﬁrms that are located in industry clusters
are involved in more acquisitions and maintain more ﬁnancial slack than their industry peers
that are located away from clusters. Although our main focus has been on industry clusters,
like Silicon Valley, we have also considered other urban characteristics, such as the size of
46We also test a speciﬁcation with state dummies (not reported) to account for diﬀe r e n c e si nt a x a t i o na n d
regulation across states. When we in c l u d es t a t ed u m m i e st h er e s u l t sa r e weakened for market leverage but
remain statistically very signiﬁcant for net market leverage and cash-holdings.
47T h er e g r e s s i o n si nT a b l eV I If o l l o wt h es a m es p e c i ﬁcations as the Net Market Leverage regressions in
Table IV, and the Log(Cash/n-TA) regressions in Table VI (except that now we add the new variable of
interest: MSA R&D/MSA TA or/and Population Growth). These regressions also include industry dummies
and hence, control for the possibility that high R&D industries exhibit a greater tendency to cluster.
48We have also run these tests for older ﬁrms, and have found consistent results: older ﬁr m si nh i g hR & D
and growing MSAs also have more ﬁnancial slack.
20the metropolitan area, the rate of growth of the metropolitan area and the R&D intensity
of the metropolitan area. In this regard, we ﬁnd that, ceteris paribus, ﬁr m si nh i g ht e c h
cities and growing cities tend to maintain more ﬁnancial slack.49
This paper contributes to the corporate ﬁnance literature that examines the determi-
nants of corporate debt ratios and cash holdings. Up to now, the focus of this literature has
been on the characteristics of ﬁrms, and the extent to which these characteristics correlate
with how they are ﬁnanced. In this paper we show that ﬁrm’s locations are also related to
their capital structure choices, and argue that ﬁrms in locations that facilitate investment
opportunities maintain more ﬁnancial slack.
As we discussed in the introduction, although the negative relation between acquisitions
and debt ratios has been previously established, the direction of causation between opportu-
nities and ﬁnancial slack has not been fully resolved. Given the arguments in Jensen (1986)
and others, it is plausible that this association arises because ﬁrms exploit opportunities
when they have ﬁnancial slack rather than maintaining ﬁnancial slack when they anticipate
opportunities. However, since cluster and city growth eﬀects are likely to be directly related
to acquisitions and other opportunities, but can be viewed as exogenous with respect to the
ﬁrm’s capital structure choice, the observed relation between geography and ﬁnancial slack
in this study is likely to arise from the eﬀect that the presence of potential opportunities
produces on a ﬁrm’s desire to maintain ﬁnancial slack.
49Since knowledge spillovers are particularly important for high R&D industries, this ﬁnding is consistent
with Glaeser et al. (1992) which documents the importance of knowledge spillovers for the growth in cities.
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  Mean Values    Industry Adjusted Mean Values
   Whole Sample  Cluster  Off-Cluster  Difference 
b  Cluster Off-Cluster Difference 
b 
                
Sales  1385 1281  1459  -178 
(-0.77) 
   244  -172  416 
(2.72) 
EBITDA / TA  0.159 0.155  0.162  -0.007 
(-1.42) 
 -0.004  0.003  -0.007 
(-1.84) 
Market to Book  2.201 2.741  1.820  0.922 
(14.50) 
 0.181  -0.128  0.310 
(6.74) 
Tangible Assets / TA  0.227 0.170  0.268  -0.097 
(-14.12) 
 -0.011  0.008  -0.018 
(-4.08) 
R&D / TA  0.065 0.098  0.042  0.056 
(18.83) 
 0.010  -0.007  0.018 
(7.70) 
Capital Exp. / TA  0.067 0.069  0.066  0.003 
(1.53) 
 0.001  -0.001  0.001 
(0.80) 
Stock Return  0.254 0.317  0.209  0.108 
(9.19) 
 0.023  -0.016  0.039 
(4.19) 
Cash Flow Std. Dev.  0.032 0.041  0.026  0.016 
(12.50) 
 0.003  -0.002  0.005 
(5.72) 
Firm Age  18.264 14.562  20.884  -6.322 
(-8.71) 
 -0.702  0.497  -1.199 
(-2.32) 
Book Leverage  0.476 0.436  0.504  -0.069 
(-7.33) 
 -0.008  0.006  -0.014 
(-1.95) 
Market Leverage  0.322 0.247  0.374  -0.127 
(-13.08) 
 -0.018  0.013  -0.031 
(-4.57) 
Net Book Leverage  0.285 0.152  0.379  -0.227 
(-14.98) 
 -0.044  0.031  -0.074 
(-6.65) 
Net Market Leverage  0.227 0.118  0.305  -0.187 
(-16.72) 
 -0.032  0.023  -0.054 
(-6.84) 
Cash / n-TA  0.323 0.526  0.180  0.346 
(17.41) 
 0.085  -0.060  0.145 
(9.83) 
Log(Cash / n-TA)  -2.246 -1.381  -2.860  1.479 
(21.62) 
 0.302  -0.214  0.516 
(10.39) 
Rating  0.035 0.041  0.030  0.011 
(0.91) 
 0.009  -0.006  0.015 
(1.78) 
Dividend  0.340 0.187  0.447  -0.260 
(-11.13) 
 -0.032  0.023  -0.055 
(-3.39) 
Population  15.085 15.849  14.545  1.304 
(21.98) 
      
                
 
   NOTES 
 
a.  Details on the definition and construction of the variables reported in the table are available in the Data Appendix. 
 
b.  “Difference” is the difference between the mean value In-Cluster and Off-Cluster (robust and clustered by firm t- 






Table II Mergers & Acquisitions 
 












Ratio of acquirers  0.164  0.192  0.144  0.047 
(7.30) 
Ratio of local acquirers  0.026  0.050  0.009  0.041 
(14.80) 
Acquisitions per firm  0.207  0.251  0.175  0.076 
(8.14) 
Local acquisitions per firm  0.027  0.053  0.009  0.044 
(14.57) 
Total transaction value / TA  0.056  0.073  0.044  0.029 
(8.71) 
Total local transaction value / TA  0.005  0.009  0.001  0.008 
(13.41) 
 









Ratio of acquirers  0.046  0.063  0.034  0.029 
(7.93) 
Ratio of local acquirers  0.008  0.019  0.001  0.018 
(10.76) 
Acquisitions per firm  0.051  0.071  0.036  0.035 
(8.17) 
Local acquisitions per firm  0.009  0.019  0.001  0.018 
(10.68) 
Total transaction value / TA  0.017  0.025  0.011  0.014 
(8.34) 






a. Details on the definition and construction of the variables reported in the table are available in the Data 
Appendix. 
 
b. “Difference” is the difference between the mean value In-Cluster and Off-Cluster (robust and clustered 
by firm t- statistics are provided in parenthesis).  
 
Table III 
Mergers & Acquisitions Regressions 




 Number of Firms in MSA / 10  0.006 0.006 0.001  0.005 0.015  0.032  0.003  0.019 
 
  (2.42) (3.94) (0.59)  (3.09)  (3.11) (4.38) (0.53)  (2.52) 
Net Market Leverage     -0.123 -0.039      -0.473 -0.687 
 
     (6.15) (4.40)     (7.47)  (6.30) 
Net Market Leverage  x  (Number of Firms in MSA / 10)     -0.034 -0.015      -0.056  -0.054 
 
     (3.19) (2.89)      (1.94) (1.25) 
Sales     0.039 0.024      0.078 0.188 
 
     (9.29) (11.05)      (7.80) (12.56) 
EBITDA/TA     0.085  0.023     0.278  0.105 
 
     (2.59) (1.27)      (3.46) (0.78) 
Average Stock Return     0.064 0.018      0.205 0.164 
 
     (6.87) (3.75)      (9.47) (4.63) 
Firm Age     -0.002 -0.001      -0.004 -0.005 
 
     (4.27) (2.47)      (3.82) (2.82) 
Population     -0.002  -0.003     -0.005  -0.032 
 
     (0.48) (1.95)      (0.55) (2.29) 
                
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
                
N  13342 13342 13328  13328  13342 13342 13328  13328 
R
2  0.03 0.02 0.07  0.04       




a.  Details on the definition and construction of the variables reported in the table are available in the Data Appendix. 
 
b.  Each column corresponds to a different regression. Reported are the estimated coefficients with their t-statistics in parenthesis (standard errors are 
robust and clustered by firm). For (1) and (3), dummy variable indicating an acquisition is the dependent variable. For (2) and (4), dummy variable 
indicating acquisition of a public target is the dependent variable. For (5) and (7) Total Transaction Value/TA is the dependent variable. For (6) and 
































Number of Firms in MSA / 10 -0.007 -0.003  -0.009           
 
 
(3.66)  (2.41)  (4.99)           
Ratio of Firms in MSA        -0.178 -0.137  -0.302       
 
      
(3.28) (3.00)  (5.36)       
Cluster            -0.027  -0.020  -0.049 
 
 
          (2.61)  (2.20)  (4.35) 
Sales  0.035 0.013  0.022 0.036  0.014 0.023 0.035  0.013 0.022 
 
 
(12.59) (4.93)  (7.40) (12.72)  (5.08) (7.64)  (12.50)  (4.94) (7.35) 
EBITDA / TA  -0.447 -0.396  -0.360 -0.441  -0.394 -0.353 -0.442  -0.394 -0.356 
 
 
(16.24) (18.47)  (14.55) (16.05)  (18.55) (14.46) (16.05)  (18.56) (14.52) 
Market to Book  -0.007 -0.031  -0.026 -0.007 -0.031  -0.026  -0.007 -0.031  -0.027 
 
 
(2.57) (17.60)  (12.53) (2.84)  (17.59) (12.66)  (2.96) (17.85) (13.08) 
Tangible Assets / TA  0.081 0.072  0.208 0.080 0.070  0.203  0.082 0.072  0.208 
 
 
(2.12) (2.07)  (5.32) (2.06)  (1.98) (5.15) (2.15)  (2.05) (5.31) 
R&D / TA  -0.280 -0.515  -0.700 -0.275  -0.502 -0.678 -0.289  -0.514 -0.700 
 
 
(4.19) (10.19)  (11.11) (4.07)  (9.86) (10.73) (4.32)  (10.18) (11.1) 
R&D Dummy  -0.007  0.020  0.023  -0.005 0.021  0.025  -0.004 0.021  0.026 
 
 
(0.51) (1.54)  (1.51) (0.37)  (1.60) (1.65) (0.31)  (1.64) (1.74) 
Average Stock Return  -0.008  -0.092 -0.072  -0.009  -0.093 -0.073 -0.008  -0.092 -0.072 
 
 
(1.23) (18.52)  (11.98) (1.31)  (18.65) (12.18)  (1.22) (18.50) (11.93) 
Population 0.006  0.002  -0.001  0.008  0.004 0.004 0.006 0.003  0.002 
 (1.56)  (0.54)  (0.20)  (1.99)  (1.21) (0.99) (1.62)  (0.84) (0.45) 
                 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations  13342  13342  13342  13342 13342  13342  13342 13342  13342 
R
2 0.22  0.47  0.46  0.22  0.48 
 
0.46 







a.  Details on the definition and construction of the variables reported in the table are available in the Data Appendix. 
 
b.  Each column corresponds to a different regression. Reported are the estimated coefficients with their t-statistics in 












Leverage    Market 
 Leverage    Net Book
Leverage   Net Market 
Leverage 
Cluster  -0.010   -0.062   -0.083    -0.069 
 
 
(0.62)   (3.05)    (4.23)   (2.88) 
Sales  0.037   0.014    0.057   0.024 
 
 
(11.81)   (4.62)   (14.1)    (6.93) 
EBITDA / TA  -0.465   -0.475    -0.448   -0.433 
 
 
(13.69)   (17.14)    (11.21)   (13.71) 
Market to Book  -0.008   -0.044    -0.040   -0.040 
 
 
(2.96)  (16.15)    (10.29)   (13.17) 
Tangible Assets / TA  0.082   0.068   0.373   0.202 
 
 
(2.04)   (1.73)    (7.56)   (4.54) 
R&D / TA  -0.317   -0.659    -0.749   -0.905 
 
 
(4.41)  (10.11)    (7.88)   (11.00) 
R&D Dummy  -0.005   0.015   0.020    0.020 
 
 
(-0.39)   (1.08)   (1.14)    (1.16) 
Average Stock Return -0.008   -0.109   -0.031    -0.088 
 
 
(1.20)  (16.89)    (3.39)   (11.86) 
Population  0.006   0.003    0.004   0.001 
 
 
(1.57)   (0.82)    (0.72)   (0.34) 
λ  0.910   0.652   1.016   0.636 
 
 
(1.30)  (11.10)    (0.27)   (9.57) 
 
            
 
           
Year Dummies  Yes   Yes    Yes   Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes   Yes    Yes   Yes 
             
Observations  13342   13342    13342   13342 
R
2  0.22   0.49    0.42   0.47 




a. Details on the definition and construction of the variables reported in the table are 
available in the Data Appendix. 
 
b. Each column corresponds to a different regression. Reported are the estimated 
coefficients with their t-statistics in parenthesis (standard errors are robust and 






  OLS NLLS 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 




   
  
Ratio of Firms in MSA      0.898 2.527       
 
    
(7.27) (7.38)       
Cluster       0.137  0.460  0.805 
 
    
   (7.11)  (6.50)  (5.76) 
Sales  -0.043 -0.064 -0.046 -0.075 -0.043 -0.067 -0.079 
 
 
(7.67) (2.90) (8.21) (3.43) (7.83) (3.05) (3.09) 
Market to Book  0.077 0.213 0.079 0.216 0.081 0.220 0.274 
 
 
(12.05) (15.49) (12.65) (15.92) (12.78) (16.39) (13.50) 
R&D / TA  1.324 4.898 1.317 4.784 1.381 4.902 5.899 
 
 
(9.73) (12.45) (9.56) (12.14)  (10.22)  (12.50)  (11.24) 
R&D Dummy  -0.001  -0.218  -0.009  -0.235  -0.013  -0.248 -0.246 
 
 
(0.04) (2.26) (0.54) (2.43) (0.80) (2.59) (2.33) 
Capital Exp / TA  -0.776 -1.552 -0.784 -1.570 -0.780 -1.555 -1.837 
 
 
(8.06) (4.22) (8.14) (4.26) (8.05) (4.23) (4.35) 
Debt Rating  -0.086  0.035  -0.081  0.053  -0.094  0.015 0.046 
 
 
(2.64) (0.19) (2.29) (0.28) (2.85) (0.08) (0.20) 
Dividend  0.004 0.010 0.009 0.027 0.005 0.019 0.068 
 
 
(0.24) (0.13) (0.54) (0.37) (0.28) (0.27) (0.86) 
Cash Flow  Std. Dev.   0.634  2.429  0.637  2.350  0.637  2.276 2.922 
 
 
(1.72) (2.55) (1.75) (2.49) (1.73) (2.41)  (2.6) 
Average Stock Return  0.051 0.256 0.052 0.261 0.050 0.252 0.286 
 
 
(3.87) (6.84) (4.05) (6.99) (3.76) (6.69) (6.54) 
Population  0.008  0.064  -0.003 0.025 0.005 0.037 0.041 
 
 
(1.84) (2.51) (0.53) (0.91) (1.24) (1.35) (1.47) 
λ         0.738 
 
 
       ( 5 . 1 1 )  
         
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Observations  13342 13277 13342 13277 13342 13277 13342 
R
2  0.38 0.43 0.38 0.43 0.38 0.43 0.43 






a. Each column corresponds to a different regression. Reported are the estimated 
coefficients with their t-statistics in parenthesis (standard errors are robust and clustered 
by firm). For λ the reported t-statistic corresponds to the test of the hypothesis λ≠1. 
Coefficients that are significant at the 5% level are highlighted in bold.  
 
b. For (1), (3), and (5), Cash/n-TA is the dependent variable.  For (2), (4), (6), and (7), 
LogCash/n-TA) is the dependent variable.  Table VII Older Firm Regressions 
 
  Panel A: M&A Regression Analysis 
  All Acquisitions  Public Acquisitions  All Acquisitions  Public Acquisitions 
Number of Firms in MSA / 10  0.005  0.006  -0.001 0.004 
  (1.28) (2.45) (0.26) (1.61) 
Net Market Leverage     -0.123 -0.034 
     (4.84) (3.13) 
Net Market Leverage. x (Number of Firms in MSA/10)     -0.035 -0.024 
     (2.22) (3.20) 
Sales     0.071  0.040 
     (1.53) (1.47) 
EBITDA/TA     0.032 0.022 
     (6.67) (8.82) 
Average Stock Return (3)     0.040  0.013 
     (3.16) (1.87) 
Firm Age     -0.001 -0.001 
     (2.27) (1.98) 
Population     0.001  -0.003 
     (0.13) (1.82) 
R-squared  0.03 0.02 0.06 0.05 
 
  Panel B: Leverage and Cash Regressions 
  Book Leverage  Market Leverage  Net Market Leverage  Cash / n-TA 
Number of Firms in MSA / 10  -0.009     -0.004     -0.011     0.043    
  (3.30)     (1.94)     (4.06)     (5.86)     
Ratio of Firms in MSA    -0.178     -0.109     -0.275     0.769   
    (2.58)     (1.81)     (3.66)     (4.93)   
Sales  0.033  0.033  0.011  0.012  0.019  0.020   -0.029 -0.030   
  (9.84)  (9.89)  (3.64)  (3.73)  (5.37)  (5.48)   (4.86)  (5.00)   
EBITDA/TA  -0.499  -0.499  -0.451  -0.451  -0.401  -0.401       
  (11.17)  (11.16)  (12.97)  (12.97)  (10.17)  (10.19)        
Market to Book  -0.007  -0.007    -0.042  -0.042  -0.038  -0.038  0.079  0.081  
  (1.64)  (1.73)   (14.14)  (14.05)  (11.24)  (11.19)  (8.03)  (8.17)  
Tangible Assets / TA  0.051  0.052    0.036  0.035    0.161 0.161       
  (1.05)  (1.06)  (0.84)  (0.84)  (3.39)  (3.38)        
R&D / TA  -0.339  -0.358  -0.476  -0.478  -0.667  -0.679  1.191  1.319  
  (3.21)  (3.35)  (6.26)  (6.18)  (7.12)  (7.16)   (6.29)  (6.83)   
R&D  Dummy  -0.027  -0.025  0.007  0.008  0.004  0.006   0.015  0.008   
  (1.60)  (1.50)  (0.43)  (0.49)  (0.19)  (0.31)   (0.80)  (0.42)   
Capital Exp  / TA               -0.912 -0.964   
               (7.25)  (7.59)   
Debt Rating               -0.104 -0.098   
               (3.14)  (2.90)   
Dividend               0.008 0.009   
               (0.48)  (0.56)   
Cash Flow Std. Dev.               1.410 1.489   
               (2.09)  (2.21)   
Average Stock Return  -0.005  -0.006    -0.101  -0.101  -0.086  -0.086  0.029 0.032   
  (0.56)  (0.59)   (12.80)  (12.83)   (9.19)  (9.24)   (1.75)  (1.90)   
Population  0.009 0.010    0.004  0.006  0.003  0.006   0.004 -0.001   
  (2.09)  (2.29)  (1.07)  (1.33)  (0.55)  (1.16)   (0.85)  (0.18)   
R-squared  0.22  0.22  0.48  0.48  0.44  0.44   0.38  0.37   
 
Notes:   
a) Older Firms are firms that did their IPO at least 10 years before; b) All regressions contain Year Dummies and Industry 
Dummies; c) The number of firm-year observations is 8415; d). Standard errors are robust and clustered by firm.  
 
Table VIII 
 Region Specific Controls 
  Market Leverage  Net Market Leverage  Log(Cash/ n-TA) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Number of Firms in MSA / 10  -0.003  -0.002 -0.002   -0.009 -0.007 -0.007  0.080  0.067  0.069   
  (2.23) (1.75) (1.53)    (4.73) (4.01) (3.74)    (7.02) (6.32) (6.01)   
Ratio of Firms in MSA      -0.136     -0.292     2.414 
     (2.65)       (4.66)       (6.28) 
Population Growth  -0.698  -0.804 -0.882 -0.776   -0.962 -1.065 4.944  6.209 6.726 
  (2.00)  (2.30)  (2.53)  (1.86)  (2.31) (2.57)  (1.74)    (2.18) (2.37) 
MSA R&D / MSA TA                 -0.267 -0.350 -0.321   -0.497 -0.615 -0.580   3.587 4.077 3.964 
    (2.32) (2.77) (2.54)    (3.69) (4.08) (3.86)    (4.19) (4.07) (3.93) 
Sales  0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013  0.023 0.022 0.022 0.023  -0.061  -0.065 -0.061 -0.073
  (4.58) (4.86) (4.48) (4.66)  (7.04) (7.30) (6.91) (7.17)  (2.51) (2.96) (2.54) (3.03) 
EBITDA / TA  -0.415 -0.394 -0.413 -0.412 -0.376 -0.356 -0.372 -0.369     
  (15.89) (18.44) (15.83) (15.88) (12.55) (14.50) (12.47) (12.47)     
Market to Book  -0.033 -0.031 -0.033 -0.033 -0.028 -0.026 -0.028 -0.028 0.218 0.211 0.215 0.217 
  (15.74) (17.47) (15.62) (15.53) (11.43) (12.37) (11.27) (11.26) (13.29) (15.43) (13.20) (13.56)
Tangible Assets / TA  0.074 0.074 0.076 0.072  0.208 0.211 0.211 0.205      
  (1.97) (2.11) (2.03) (1.92)  (4.93) (5.41) (5.04) (4.86)      
R&D / TA  -0.520 -0.489 -0.488 -0.472 -0.736 -0.652 -0.680 -0.654 5.004 4.577 4.674 4.551 
  (9.06) (9.60) (8.42) (8.08) (10.32) (10.23) (9.42)  (9.05) (11.32) (11.44) (10.36) (10.08)
R&D Dummy  0.020 0.018 0.018 0.019  0.021 0.020 0.018 0.021  -0.208 -0.196 -0.186 -0.206
  (1.42) (1.43) (1.30) (1.38)  (1.28) (1.33) (1.09) (1.25)  (1.96) (2.03) (1.74) (1.93) 
Average Stock Return  -0.086 -0.092 -0.086 -0.086 -0.066 -0.072 -0.066 -0.066 0.238 0.260 0.239 0.241 
  (14.81) (18.60) (14.84) (14.91) (9.58) (12.11) (9.64)  (9.73)  (5.59) (6.99) (5.67) (5.75) 
Capital Exp/TA            -1.848 -1.622 -1.963 -2.006
            (4.37) (4.43) (4.66) (4.77) 
Debt Rating            0.020  0.035  0.017  0.038 
            (0.11) (0.19) (0.09) (0.20) 
Dividend            -0.030  0.033  -0.002 0.017 
            (0.40) (0.47) (0.02) (0.22) 
Cash Flow Std. Dev.            2.769 2.360 2.643 2.517 
            (2.53) (2.47) (2.42) (2.32) 
Population  0.001 0.003 0.001 0.005  -0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.005  0.074 0.054 0.063 0.021 
  (0.12) (0.77) (0.36) (1.04)  (0.60) (0.15) (0.25) (0.86)  (2.41) (2.16) (2.06) (0.65) 
                    
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                
Observations  10839 13342 10839 10839  10839 13342 10839 10839  10791 13277 10791 10791 
R
2  0.47 0.48 0.47 0.47  0.45 0.46 0.46 0.46  0.43 0.43 0.44 0.44 
                   
 
Notes:  
a.  Details on the definition and construction of the variables reported in the table are available in the Data Appendix. 
 
b.  Each column corresponds to a different regression. Reported are the estimated coefficients with their t-statistics in 
parenthesis (standard errors are robust and clustered by firm). Data Appendix 
 
Acquisitions per firm is the number of acquisitions per firm. 
 
All Acquisitions is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if during that year the firm acquires another firm and of 0 otherwise. 
 
Average Stock Return is the firm’s average stock return over the last three years. 
 
Book Debt (BD) is TA minus BE. 
 
Book Equity (BE) is defined as TA minus liabilities (Item 181) plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (Item35) 
minus PS. 
Book Leverage is BD over TA. 
 
Capital Exp. / TA is capital expenditures (Item 128) over TA. 
 
Cash Flow Std Dev. is the standard deviation of EBITDA/TA during the sample period. 
 
Cash/ n-TA is cash and marketable securities (Item 1) over TA minus cash. 
 
Cluster is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if there are 10 or more firms from the same industry within the Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (MSA) as identified by the U.S. Census Bureau in 1990 and of 0 otherwise. 
 
Debt Rating takes the value of one if the firm has an S&P investment grade long-term debt rating. 
 
Dividend takes the value of one if the firm pays dividend (Item 26). 
 
EBITDA/TA is EBITDA (Item13) over lagged TA.  
 
Local acquisitions per firm is the number of acquisitions within the same MSA per firm. 
 
Market Equity (ME) is common shares outstanding (Item 25) times the stock price (Item 199). 
 
Market Leverage is BD over MV. 
 
Market-to-Book ratio is defined as MV over TA. 
 
Market Value (MV) is defined as liabilities (Item181) minus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (Item 35) plus 
PS plus ME. 
 
MSA R&D / MSA TA is the ratio of total expenditures to total assets in the MSA. 
 
Net Book Leverage is BD minus cash and marketable securities (Item 1) over TA. 
 
Net Cash/ TA is cash and marketable securities (Item 1) minus short-term debt (Item 34) over TA. 
 
Net Market Leverage is BD minus cash and marketable securities (Item 1) over MV.   
 
Number of Firms in MSA is the number of firms within the same industry in an MSA. 
 
Public Acquisitions is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if during that year the firm acquires another public firm and of 0 otherwise. 
 
Population is the natural logarithm of population estimate of MSA. 
 
Population Growth is annual population growth in the MSA. 
 
Preferred Stock (PS) is equal to liquidating value (Item 10) if available, else redemption value (Item 56) if available, else carrying 
value (Item 130). 
 Ratio of acquirers is the proportion of firms that acquire another firm. 
 
Ratio of local acquirers is the proportion of firms that acquire another firm within the same MSA. 
 
Ratio of local firms is the ratio of number of firms within the same industry to total number of firms classified in the same industry in the 
U.S 
 
R&D Dummy takes the value of one if COMPUSTAT reports R&D expense as missing. 
 
Ratio of Firms in MSA is the number of firms within the same industry in an MSA divided by the total number of firms within the 
same industry. 
 
R&D / TA is defined as R&D expenses (Item 46) over TA. 
 
Sales is the natural logarithm of sales (Item 12) in 1990 dollars. 
 
Selling Exp. / TA is selling and administrative expenses (Item 189) over TA. 
 
Stock Return is the firm’s annual stock return. 
 
Tangible Assets / TA is net property, plant and equipment (Item 8) over TA. 
 
Total Assets (TA) is measured as the book value of assets (Item 6) 
 
Total transaction value / TA is the total value of the acquisitions over TA 
 
Total local transaction value / TA is the total value of the local acquisitions over TA 
 